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Mass incarceration distorts society in peculiar ways. Obvi-
ously there are individual effects, felt keenly by the 2.1 million
people who wake up behind bars every morning.' There are so-
cial effects, experienced by the approximately two million chil-
dren with a parent in custody 2 and by neighborhoods where
whole segments of the population have been removed.3 Lastly,
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ing Constituents: Prisoners and Political Clout in New York, the first systematic
state analysis of the impact of prisoner enumeration policies on legislative redis-
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1. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ
200248, PRISONERS IN 2002 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/p02.pdf [hereinafter PRISONERS IN 20021.
2. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ
175688, WOMEN OFFENDERS 8 tbl.18 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/wo.pdf; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BULL. No. NCJ 182335, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN (2000),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Todd Clear, The Problem with "Addition by Subtraction", in INVIsi-
BLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 181
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
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there are budgetary effects such as states cutting education
budgets while prison budgets continue at record highs. 4
Other effects of mass incarceration are so subtle they pass
without notice. Basic tools of democratic society slip out of
place and cease to function properly. The census is one of those
tools.
Obtaining an accurate count of the population is so funda-
mental to representative democracy that the framers of the
Constitution required it in the opening paragraphs. Article I
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution requires an "actual enumera-
tion" of the population every ten years "in such manner as they[the Congress] shall by law direct."5 This enumeration is used
to apportion voting representation, draw political boundaries
and allocate funds among state and local governments. Taking
the 2000 decennial census required "the largest peacetime mo-
bilization in the nation's history ...."6
But mass incarceration distorts this fundamental tool. The
U.S. Census Bureau counts people in prison where their bodies
are confined-in prison-not the communities they come from
and where they are genuine members. 7 This would be an item
of statistical trivia, but the new numbers give it new meaning.
More people now live in prison and jail than in our three least
populous states combined.8 Organized differently, they would
4. See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST, Cellblocks or Classrooms?: The Funding of
Higher Education and Corrections and It's Impact on African American Men(2002), available at http://w-wwjusticepolicy.orglarticle.php?list=type&type=20.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2; Congress fulfills this function in the Census Act, 13
U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
6. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Workers Ready to Contact
Households That Did Not Respond to Census 2000 (Apr. 25, 2000), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2000/cb00cn37.html.
7. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2000 CENSUS OF POPU-
LATION AND HOUSING: SUMMARY FILE 3 TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION C-2 (2002),
available at http://web.archive.org/web/2OO3040505 1 219/http://www.census.gov/
prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY FILE 3].
8. According to the Census, the combined population of the three smallest
states is 1,729,541 (Wyoming, 493,782; Vermont, 608,827; and Alaska, 626,931).
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates, at http://eire.census.gov/popest/data/
states/files/ST-EST2003-AS200004.csv (Apr. 1, 2000). According to PRISONERS IN
2002, the total number people in confinement are 2,166,260 (prisons, 1,440,655;
local jails, 665,475; juvenile, military, immigration and other facilities, 139,527).
PRISONERS IN 2002, supra note 1, at 1.
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have six votes in the United States Senate. It is not trivia
anymore.
Yet organization is precisely the problem. The high rates of
incarceration are not evenly distributed across the population.
White men are imprisoned at a rate of 912 per 100,000; black
men are imprisoned at a rate of 3,437 per 100,000. 9 Moreover,
imprisonment moves people in predictable patterns-typically
out of large urban centers and into rural communities.
Whether these differences reflect different involvement in crim-
inal behavior or selective enforcement is actually beside the
point. From the point of view of the Census Bureau, it does not
matter. If people are in prison, that's where their bodies count.
This article discusses the primary consequences of the way
the Census Bureau counts people in prison-the impact on elec-
toral apportionment and financial distributions. It maps the
U.S. population, explains how and why the Census Bureau acts
as it does, and suggests possible reforms. In brief, the article
finds consistent, low-level distortions in both voting and fund-
ing that could be avoided if the Census Bureau counted people
differently.
I. The Rules
The first step is understanding how the census works. The
Census Bureau's general rule is to count people in their "usual
residence," the place where they live and sleep most of the time.
The usual residence need not be the same as a person's legal or
voting address, and a person need not be there on the literal
census day (April 1st).10 They can take a vacation and still
count at home.
Determining the usual residence for most people is easy.
However, special categories present special challenges. Sailors
in the merchant marine, children in joint custody and long-term
commuters all require special rules, and these rules have
evolved over time.'" People in prison are in a category called
9. PRISONERS IN 2002, supra note 1, at 9 tbl.14.
10. U.S. Census Bureau, Facts About Census 2000 Residence Rules: The Con-
cept of Unusual Residence, at http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/
resid rules.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Residence Rules].
11. Peter Wagner, Usual Residence Rule Has Been Modified for Other Special
Populations and Can be Changed for Prisoners Too, PrisonersoftheCensus.org, at
2004]
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"group quarters" which includes nursing homes, college dormi-
tories, military installations and other places where unrelated
persons live together.12 As a rule, people in group quarters
count where the group quarters are located. 1 For people in
prison, that's the prison.
Discretionary decisions are made about whether people in
prison will be given census forms to fill out themselves, or
whether the warden will simply provide a headcount. One in
six people in prison is given a "long form" to fill out with addi-
tional information, just like in the general population.4 How-
ever, if the person provides anything other than the
institutional address, that information is discarded.
II. The Map
The best way to see how prisons move people is to create a
map. Fully 5% of all growth in the U.S. rural population in the
1980's was people in prison.' 5 In the 1990's, an astonishing 30%
of new residents of upstate New York were brought there
against their will.16 Guard towers are slowly replacing small
towns and family farms as the struggling heartland turns to
prisons as an industry of last resort.
All kinds of communities are affected. West Feliciana Par-
ish, Louisiana, is classified by the Census Bureau as a 100%
rural community, but 5,000 of its 15,000 residents live in cus-
tody-fully a third. 7 In comparison, Walker County, Texas is
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/factof the week-archive-3-11-2003.
shtml (Nov. 3, 2003).
12. Residence Rules, supra note 10, at Question 11.
13. Id.
14. Interview with Edison Gore, U.S. Census Bureau, Assistant DivisionChief for Planning Decennial Management Division (May 19, 2003).
15. Calvin L. Beale, Prisons, Population, and Jobs in Nonmetro America, 8
RURAL DEV. PERSP'S 16, 17 (1993).
16. ROLF PENDALL, UPSTATE NEW YORK'S POPULATION PLATEAU: THE THIRD-
SLOWEST 'STATE' (2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/es/ur-
ban/publications/200308_Pendall.pdf.
17. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GROUP QUARTERS POPULATION BY GROUPQUARTERS TYPE, at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?bm=Y&-state=
DT&-context=DT&-dsname=DEC_2000SF1_U&-mtname=DEC_2000SF1U
PCTO16&-tree-id=4001&-allgeo-types=N&.geo-id=05000US22125&-search 
re-
sults=OlOOOUS&-format=&-_lang=EN (last visited Apr. 14, 2004), with U.S. CEN-
SUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS, WEST FELICIANA PARISH, LOUISIANA,
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more urban, with small cities totaling 60,000 people-but more
than 13,000 of them cannot eat breakfast without permission of
the warden.18 Altogether, nearly 200 counties in America have
more than 5% of their population in prison.19 Eighteen counties
have more than 20% of their population in prison.
20 This ex-
traordinary transformation can be seen in the fine print of the
2000 census but it is unnoticed unless looked for.
21
Top Twenty Prison Counties
2 2
Prison Prison
State County Population % Rural Pop. %
1 Louisiana W. Feliciana Parish 15,111 100.0% 4,995 33.1%
2 Texas Concho 3,966 100.0% 1,299 32.8%
3 Florida Union 13,442 52.2% 4,052 30.1%
4 Illinois Brown 6,950 41.8% 1,912 27.5%
5 Tennessee Lake 7,954 100.0% 2,090 26.3%
6 Virginia Greensville 11,560 64.4% 3,027 26.2%
7 Texas Mitchell 9,698 32.0% 2,523 26.0%
8 California Lassen 33,828 58.7% 8,367 24.7%
9 Texas Hartley 5,537 57.6% 1,343 24.3%
10 Missouri DeKalb 11,597 67.1% 2,626 22.6%
11 Texas Jones 20,785 60.9% 4,650 22.4%
12 Texas Walker 61,758 36.3% 13,691 22.2%
13 Texas Bee 32,359 30.6% 7,070 21.8%
14 Texas Childress 7,688 34.0% 1,652 21.5%
15 Arkansas Lincoln 14,492 100.0% 3,003 20.7%
16 Texas Madison 12,940 69.9% 2,681 20.7%
17 Illinois Johnson 12,878 79.1% 2,640 20.5%
18 Nevada Pershing 6,693 100.0% 1,370 20.5%
19 Texas Anderson 55,109 41.3% 10,750 19.5%
20 Virginia Sussex 12,504 100.0% 2,379 19.0%
at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
2 2 /2 2 125.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2004).
18. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GROUP QUARTERS POPULATION BY GROUP
QUARTERS TYPE, at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?-bm=Y&-state=
DT&-context=DT&-dsname=DEC_2000SF1_U&-mt-name=DEC-2000-SF1_U
PCTO16&-tree id=4OOl&-redoLog=TR]ue&-all-geo-types=N&-geo-id=O5OOOUS4
8471&-search results=01000US&-format=&-_lang=EN (last visited Apr. 14,
2004), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS, WALKER
COUNTY, TEXAS, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48471.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2004).
19. One hundred and ninety-seven counties out of 3140, or 6.3% of all counties
have more than 5% of their population in prison. See generally U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2000 CENSUS, at http://www.census.gov/ (specific
data sets are on file with the author) [hereinafter 2000 CENSUS].
20. See id.
21. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2000 CENSUS OF POP-
ULATION AND HOUSING: SUMMARY FILE 1 TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION 6-68 to 6-69
(2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sfl.pdf.
22. See 2000 CENSUS, supra note 19.
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Because no distinction is made between being in or out of
custody, people in prison count the same as shoppers in the lo-
cal markets, parents whose kids will attend local schools, or
people whose political interests are represented by the person
who represents them in the legislature. Yet these individuals
are not generally from the county where the census has them
placed. They were imported from other counties for purposes of
confinement. If the doors were opened, few would stay.
If the doors were open, likely they would return to where
they came from. That's the place that most people in prison
consider their home, and where most will return within a few
years.23 The Census Bureau makes no effort to track point of
origin, but geographical information about convictions is gener-
ally available from state departments of corrections or the statejudicial branch. Comparing the two data sets reveals where
people are coming from and where they are going to.
Texas, for example, hosts nine of the top twenty counties
ranked by the percentage of population in prison. None of these
counties, however, convicts substantial numbers of people. The
table below shows how people are shipped from one county to
another. The top set of counties are all exporters and the bot-
tom are importers. Dallas, for example, convicts 15.1% of the
people in Texas state prisons but confines none of them. In con-
trast, Walker County confines 10.4% of the state prison popula-
tion but convicts hardly anybody.
23. The average time served in state prisons is 3 years. See BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULL. No. NCJ 198821, FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2000 3 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/fssc00.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
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Texas Counties that Convict or Confine People
24
% State % State % County
Prisoners Prisoners Population.
Convicted Held In State
County Population There There Prison
Exporters
Harris (Houston) 3,400,578 21.2% 2.1% 0.1%
Dallas 2,218,899 15.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Tarrant 1,446,219 7.7% 0.0% 0.0%
Bexar 1,392,931 6.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Importers
Walker 61,758 0.2% 10.4% 22.2%
Anderson 55,109 0.2% 8.2% 19.5%
Brazoria 241,767 0.8% 6.5% 3.6%
Coryell 74,978 0.1% 6.1% 10.7%
Bee 32,359 0.1% 5.4% 21.8%
Whatever benefit accrues to a jurisdiction by virtue of its
population, the urban counties are all losing it. Conversely, the
rural counties are getting more than their fair share. The next
sections discuss these benefits.
III. The Vote
The official constitutional purpose of the census is political
apportionment. 25 An accurate count of the population ensures
that each state's delegation in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives and the Electoral College is appropriately proportioned.
The principle of "one person, one vote," which started as a re-
quirement in the federal system, has since trickled down to
states and even local governments. 26 All states base their legis-
lative redistricting on U.S. census data.
27
A cursory glance indicates the potential distortion of count-
ing prisons as the "usual residence." Nearly 9% of all African
American men in their twenties and thirties live in prison.
28
Most of this group is apportioned to legislative districts that do
not reflect their communities of interest or their personal politi-
24. See 2000 CENSUS, supra note 19; see also Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
26. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
27. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 4.
28. PRISONERS 2002, supra note 1, at 9 tbl.14 (for ages 20-24 the fraction in
prison is 7.5%; ages 25-29 is 10.4%; ages 30-34 is 8.9%; ages 35-39 is 7.9%).
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cal concerns. Whether they can or do vote is irrelevant; their
bodies still count in the prison district. A more refined analysis
shows that the impact is modest in U.S. Congressional Districts
but more significant in state legislative districts.
The impact of incarceration on apportionment in the U.S.
House of Representatives is small because most people are in-
carcerated within their own state and because congressional
districts are so large. With districts containing roughly 645,000
people, 29 a few thousand people in prison are unlikely to have
much impact. Exceptions may arise as more states send people
out of state, as was the case in 1999 when Wisconsin Represen-
tative Mark Green feared that Wisconsin's plan to export al-
most 10,000 people to prisons in other states might tip
Wisconsin towards losing a seat in reapportionment. 30
The impact within state legislatures, however, is more sub-
stantial. The range in size of state legislative chambers is enor-
mous, but the median state Senate district has 106,362
residents and the median state House district has 37,564.31
Thus, just one prison of 1,000 cells is nearly 3% of the popula-
tion of a median sized House district. Given the frequent clus-
tering of prisons, the impact can accumulate dangerously.
Significant densities of prisoners in legislative districts are es-
pecially important because most criminal justice policy is made
in the states.
Under White v. Regester,32 state legislative districts are not
permitted to deviate in size by more than 10%. However, an
analysis of New York State reveals that people in prison put
29. Press Release, Election Data Services, 2000 Census Counts Produce Sur-
prises in Congressional Delegations (Dec. 28, 2000), at http://www.electiondataser-
vices.com/Apport00releasewtables.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
30. See H.R. 1632, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999) (a bill proposed to provide that
certain attribution rules be applied with respect to the counting of certain prison-
ers in a decennial census of population); see also Oversight of the 2000 Census:
Examining the Bureau's Policy to Count Prisoners, Military Personnel, and Ameri-
cans Residing Overseas, Hearing on H.R. 1632 Before the Subcomm. on the Census
of the House Comm. on Government Reform, 106th Cong (1999).
31. National Conference of State Legislatures, Constituents per State Legisla-
tive District: Legislatures Ranked by Size, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/leg-
manlelect/cnstprst.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
32. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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district deviations over the maximum range. 33 The most signifi-
cant work to date is Importing Constituents: Prisoners and Po-
litical Clout in New York. 34 This report documents that in four
New York Senate districts and in ten Assembly districts more
than 2% of the constituents are in prison. 35 Analysis in other
states and at the county level is ongoing.
33. PETER WAGNER, IMPORTING CONSTITUENTS: PRISONERS AND POLITICAL
CLOUT IN NEW YORK: A PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE REPORT 10-12 (2002) available at
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/importing/importing-body.pdf [hereinafter IMPORTING
CONSTITUENTS].
34. Id.
35. Id. at 8.
595
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The district of Republican Assemblyperson Chris Ortloff con-
tains the highest percentage of people in prison: 7%.37 The pop-
ulation represented by Assemblyperson Ortloff includes 9,251
prisoners, of whom 4,623 are Black.38 In a district that is al-
ready 89% White, 82.6% "of the Black adults in Ortloffs district
are barred by law from ever voting for or against him."39 By the
time these prisoners complete their sentences and are again al-
lowed to vote, they will be back home in a different district.
Similar deviations exist in the New York State Senate. All
of the Senate districts in urban Queens County in New York
City were drawn to contain between 12,409 and 12,412 too
many people, a deviation of +4.05%.40 Conversely, a number of
rural Senate districts are short as many as 15,147 residents for
a deviation of -4.95%.41 By the official numbers, the deviation
between districts is 9.78%, slightly less than the maximum al-
lowed.42 But if the prisoners were counted where they actually
are from, the deviation between over-populated Queens and
under-populated rural senate districts would rise to 11.4%,
43
more than allowed by White.44 Senator Volker, for example,
represents just 285,305 free people in his rural district; Senator
Maltese from Queens represents 318,484. 45 The result is that
each free resident of a rural district with prisons gets a larger
voice in the state capitol than residents of districts in Queens.
37. IMPORTING CONSTITUENTS, supra note 33, at 8.
38. IMPORTING CONSTITUENTS APPENDIX, supra note 36, at 35.
39. See IMPORTING CONSTITUENTS, supra note 33, at 8; see also N.Y. State Leg.
Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment, New York Assembly
District 114 2 (2002), available at http://1atfor.state.ny.us/maps/propassem/fall4.
pdf.
40. IMPORTING CONSTITUENTS, supra note 33, at 11.
41. IMPORTING CONSTITUENTS APPENDIX, supra note 36, at 28-30 figl0.
42. IMPORTING CONSTITUENTS, supra note 33, at 10.
43. See id. at 11 figs.3-4 (the difference between the maximum figures is
11.4%).
44. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
45. IMPORTING CONSTITUENTS, supra note 33, at 11.
20041
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It is no coincidence, then, that some of the strongest propo-
nents of incarcerative policies were upstate Republican Sena-
tors Volker and Nozzolio, heads of the Committees on Codes
and Crime, respectively.48 Prisons are not just big business in
their districts, they inflate the political clout of every real rural
constituent. Going in to the 2002 redistricting, the prisons in
their two districts held more than 23% of the state's prisoners.
49
Senator Volker readily admits that he does not represent
the prisoners in any real sense. He told Newhouse News Service
that he regularly receives letters from prisoners but that his
real attention is directed toward corrections workers, with
whom he has forged strong relationships. Volker is glad the
prisoners in his district cannot vote, because if they could, "they
wouldn't vote for me. 5 °
Overall, in the states, counting urban residents as rural re-
sidents dilutes urban voting strength and increases the weight
of a vote in the rural districts. In the rural prison districts, the
real residents benefit because their own issues can receive indi-
vidual attention from their representative on a scale unavaila-
ble elsewhere. In contrast, urban legislators are responsible not
only to their "official" district but also those community mem-
bers miscounted in the prison diaspora. One can only imagine
the political negotiations of reapportionment, and how a plum
like a prison must count.
Below the state level, in county and town governments, the
impacts become more profound. In Mansfield, Ohio, two large
state prisons make up more than half of Ward 5,51 giving the
voting residents disproportionate voice. In many cases, though,
the results are so obvious, unexpected and unfair that people in
prison are removed from the counts.52 In Greene County, New
48. Editorial, Full-Employment Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2001, at A18.
49. These figures were somewhat lower after the 2000 redistricting, because
the large increase in the prisoner population during the previous decade, forced
these legislators to "share the wealth" with their neighboring but non-prison host-
ing districts.
50. Jonathan Tilove, Minority Prison Inmates Skew Local Populations as
States Redistrict, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERV., Mar. 12, 2002, at http://www.newhouse
news.com/archive/storyla031202.html.
51. Linda Martz, Taxpayers Before Wards, MANSFIELD NEWS J., Nov. 26, 2002,
at 6A.
52. Tilove, supra note 50.
59920041
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
York, where the prison town of Coxsackie would have earned
almost another full seat in the county legislature, the legisla-
ture voted to remove the prison population from the apportion-
ment entirely.5 3 Those individuals simply disappear. Of course,
exclusion is logical because people in prison aren't real re-
sidents, but it seems legally and morally inconsistent to retain
them in some apportionment schemes but not others. Simi-
larly, Iberville Parish, Louisiana excluded the prison population
from school board redistricting to avoid drawing a district that
only had two eligible voters. 54 The inconsistencies make the
problem obvious: Gardner, Massachusetts was happy to claim
people in prison for state legislative and congressional pur-
poses, but it excluded them in the City Council redistricting
process because the 892 disenfranchised prisoners would have
earned their own district.55 Thus, politicians at different levels
seek to count things in different ways.
The majority of states have constitutional provisions or
statutes defining the important principle of residence for electo-
ral purposes. While most state constitutions authorize the dis-
enfranchisement of people in prison, they also offer explicit
instructions that their residence does not change by virtue of
incarceration. Indeed, the New York Constitution declares: "no
person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence, by
reason of his presence or absence.., while confined in any pub-
lic prison."5 6 The Massachusetts Constitution's definition of "in-
habitant" has led the state supreme court to doubt the state
constitutionality of this application of the "usual residence"
rule, inviting litigation in that state.57
53. Peter Wagner, Prisoners Skew Local Rural Redistricting Too, Prisoner-
softheCensus.org, at http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/fact-22-9-2003.
shtml (Sept. 22, 2003).
54. Tilove, supra note 50.
55. Mary Jo Hill, Gardner Excludes Prison Inmates from Political Map,
WORCESTER TELEGRAM AND GAZETTE, June 5, 2001, at B4.
56. N.Y. CONST. art 2, § 4. The New York State Constitution foresees the pos-
sibility that the census could be inadequate for state redistricting purposes in that
it requires use of census data only "in so far as such census and the tabulation
thereof purport to give the information necessary therefore" and mandates a spe-
cial state census to fill in the gaps. N.Y. CONST. art 3, § 4.
57. "We think it clear without elaboration that a census that determines the
place of which a person is an inhabitant on the basis of where he or she lives and
sleeps most of the time will not satisfy the requirement of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth that a person be assigned as an inhabitant to the place of his or
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IV. The Money
Larger places typically have greater needs and receive a
corresponding share of government resources. Typically they
contribute more as well, though it is not a dollar-for-dollar cor-
relation. One measure of size for determining resource distri-
bution is the official U.S. census population. The involuntary
movement of the population creates a consistent, low-level dis-
tortion in funding formulations.
North Carolina distributes up to a cents per dollar of sales
tax to counties and municipalities on the basis of their popula-
tions.58 Virginia distributes state aid for K-12 education on the
basis of a complex formula that includes, among other things,
the county population. 59 Thus, rural counties that import peo-
ple for prisons come out ahead of urban counties that send peo-
ple away. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
her domicil." Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 365 Mass
661, 663-64 (1974); see also Blanchard v Stearns, 46 Mass 298, 304 (1843); Opinion
of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 122 Mass. 594, 597, 599 (1877).
58. Approximately one half of 11h cents per dollar sales tax is distributed per
capita. However, counties can opt in or opt out of some tax collections, and there
are internal distributions within counties. See N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 105-463 to 105-
520 (2002). The impact is moderated in North Carolina because the prison popula-
tion is distributed among small county prisons close to the original home. How-
ever, the state is considering a move to larger regional prisons. See Dana Damico,
Proposal Would Relieve Crowded Prisons By Easing Sentencing Rules, WINSTON
SALEM J., Apr. 23, 2003, at 1. If it does, the present sales tax structure will create
inequities. The inequalities will be especially ironic because the funds must be
spent on educational capital outlays, so the schools of exporting jurisdictions will
decay but prison towns will improve.
59. The statutory authority is distributed throughout title 22 of the Virginia
code, updated by current appropriations legislation. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58.1-638 (Michie 2001). Population affects the "composite index." See JOINT LEG-
ISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMM'N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF ELE-
MENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL FUNDING (2002), available at http://leg2.state.va.
us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/By+YearHDOC2002/$file/rpt277.pdf. The impact of population
can be seen by using the macro-enabled spreadsheets provided by the Virginia De-
partment of Education, and simply adjusting the population variable. See VA.
DEP'T OF EDUC., COMPOSITE INDEX OF LOCAL ABILITY TO PAY (2002-04), available at
index worksheet is at http://www.pen.kl2.va.us/VDOE/Finance/Buget/2004cistm-
plate.xls (last visited Apr. 2, 2004); see also VA. DEP'T OF EDUC., FINAL FY 2003
DIRECT AID ENTITLEMENTS (CHAPTER 1042) BASED ON MARCH 31, 2003 AMD AS OF
JUNE 6, 2003 (STATE FUNDS ONLY), available at http://www.pen.kl2.va.us/VDOE/
Finance/Budget/CalcTool-FinalEntitlements.xls (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). The
city of Richmond loses roughly $230,000 annually. The prison county of Sussex,
gains approximately $90,000 annually as a result of its prison population. Vir-
ginia is exceptional in using raw population in this way.
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distributes $60 million annually to impoverished Appalachian
communities via the Appalachian Regional Commission.60 Pop-
ulation is a distribution factor, so rural communities with pris-
ons have an advantage over communities without prisons.
There is no indication that the USDA intended to reward prison
construction, but it has that result.
The amount of money at stake is difficult to generalize.
Some states (e.g., Texas) move hardly any revenues between ge-
ographic regions or levels of government whereas other states
(e.g., Arizona) move funds generously. Similarly, many spe-
cialty taxes (e.g., liquor taxes, cigarette taxes, recreational park
usage fees and hunting-fishing license fees) are distributed on
the basis of population, but a specialty tax that moves signifi-
cant revenues in one state might not even exist in another. 61
The largest funding flows-schools, health and highways-tend
not to depend upon population.
With these cautions firmly in mind, it is still worth drawing
some broad, general conclusions. All things considered, the to-
tal impact of counting prisoners in their institutional communi-
ties rather than their communities of origin runs a range
between $50 and $250 per person. This estimate is based upon
budgetary analysis of numerous jurisdictions, ranging from
towns to states, as well as news accounts and interviews with
responsible officials. The impact is seldom far below $50 per
head and rarely in the high $200's. Most frequently it appears
to run in the range of $100 per head.
Thus, when a jurisdiction announces plans to open a new
1,000-bed prison, pause to consider: It will likely generate some-
thing like $100,000 in new, "unearned" revenues. Of course, the
estimate could be wrong by over 100% in either direction-de-
pending upon what state it is in, how that state shares reve-
60. See The Catalog of Fed. Domestic Assistance, 23.001 Appalachian Re-
gional Development, available at http://www.cfda.gov/public/viewprog.asp?progid=
678 (last visited Apr. 2, 2004); see also Appalachian Regional Commission, at www.
arc.gov (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
61. Ironically, many of these specialty taxes fund programs that exclude by
definition people in prison. For example, the state hunter-fishing license fee might
be distributed for the purpose of improving sports gaming resources, and it might
be distributed to counties on the basis of population, but people in prison will never
use this resource in a county that receives a greater share as a formula artifact of
the prison population.
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nues, and the particularities of the specialty taxes-but
doubling it or halving it still gives a general idea.62 In percent-
age terms, $100,000 is seldom a great deal of money, but in dol-
lar terms it always is. Times are tight and towns are counting
every nickel. That $100,000 means a new fire truck, a free ren-
ovation for the youth center, or the computer upgrade that was
cut from last year's budget. When a new wing opens, every ad-
ditional prison bed will bring an additional $100-or
thereabouts.
The most dramatic impact is in Arizona, a state with signif-
icant revenue sharing and large prisons. Florence, Arizona, has
a free population of roughly 5,000 plus another 12,000 living
under lock and key.63 The state and federal funds specifically
linked to the incarcerated population have been estimated at $4
million annually, compared to $1.8 million for the free residents
and $2.3 million raised locally. 64 Such lucre tempted the Ari-
zona town of Buckeye to annex nearby Lewis State Prison, pop-
ulation 4,600, though first it had to defeat a matching attempt
by neighboring Gila Bend.65 The mayor of Buckeye, with a pop-
ulation 5,038 before the annexation, promised to use the ex-
pected $1.3 million to upgrade parks and family services, and
assured everybody that it would more than pay for the addi-
tional burden on fire and police.66
But it is important to note that the new funds do not usu-
ally come from the exporting jurisdiction. New York City does
not lose what Attica gains. The export of 43,000 New Yorkers to
62. Researchers who want more detail should focus on taxes on the sale of
liquor and cigarettes, and the lottery. These sources generate sizeable revenues,
exist in most states, and often consider population in the distribution formulas.
However, the largest pots of money-schools, health and highways-typically do
not have population variables. The public officials to call with questions tend to be
in state and county budget or finance offices. Elected officials and professionals in
development or planning offices seldom have precise knowledge of the relevant
formulas.
63. See 2000 CENSUS, supra note 19.
64. Nicholas Kulish, Annexing the Penitentiary, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2001, at
Al.
65. See Beth DeFalco, Buckey Wins Bid to Annex Lewis State Prison, ARiz.
REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 1999, at B1; see also S. Comm. on Judiciary, 1999 Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 1999) (committee meeting minutes), available at http://www.azleg.
state.az.us/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/Legtext/44leg/lR/commminSenate/02
02JUD%2EWPD.htm [hereinafter Arizona Committee on Judiciary].
66. Arizona Committee on Judiciary, supra note 65.
20041 603
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
upstate towns does not affect the gigantic overall population of
New York City. Although the exported New Yorkers come from
a small number of "hotspot" neighborhoods, the budget alloca-
tions within the city are not localized in that way. Departments
of sanitation and fire have total budgets, and those budgets are
distributed to districts within the city-but population is not a
variable. Similar analysis leads to similar conclusions in large
cities such as Dallas, Texas, and smaller ones such as New Ha-
ven, Connecticut.
Indeed, the most likely losers are similar jurisdictions that
share the same pot of money. For example, the USDA Appa-
lachian Regional Commission grants, 67 use population as a vari-
able. However, the urban community that exported those
prisoners isn't eligible for those funds anyway. It isn't rural.
The winner is the rural prison town and the loser is the simi-
larly situated community without a prison.
Other funding implications are even more subtle. People in
prison tend to be male and they tend to be members of minority
groups-typically more so than the host community. Thus, the
host town shows odd spikes in gender and racial distribution,
which can improve their prospects in formula grant allocations,
especially programs intended to assist minorities. Further-
more, people in prison are not technically part of the workforce,
and residents of group quarters are not members of house-
holds.68 Consequently, they do not count towards unemploy-
ment or poverty rates in a community.6 9 They do, however,
affect per capita income because it is calculated simply by divid-
ing the total community income by the total population.70 Thus,
assistance that targets communities with high unemployment
is not affected but assistance that targets communities with low
per capita income can be distorted. Ron Roth, the planning di-
rector of Coxsackie, New York, where prisoners make up 28% of
the town population of 7,600, admitted to Newsday that the
formula depression of per capita income makes the town "more
67. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
68. SuMMARY FILE 3, supra note 7 (these determinations were made by an
analysis of the technical definitions in collaboration with experts at the Census
Bureau).
69. Id. at 9-6 to 9-6 & n.1
70. Id. at B-20.
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competitive" for U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
grants aimed at low income communities. 71 "All things being
equal," he concluded, the appearance of greater need is "enough
to push us over the edge."72
V. Recommendations for Reform
Reforms are possible at many levels. Obviously, the great
underlying problem is the national over-reliance on incarcera-
tion. The ultimate solution is to fix the criminal justice system.
Reforms are needed for sentencing, prevention, preparing peo-
ple for return from prison, and a host of matters that other arti-
cles address. The nation needs to reconsider the relationship
between civil society and the hardware of justice, and truly to
address problems that are presently being locked up.
At the same time, the problems of the heartland cannot be
ignored. If they could, family farmers would prefer not to build
prisons on their land and towns would prefer not to exchange
the nighttime stars for the glare of perimeter lighting. But
without viable alternatives, such communities are pulling in
that direction. They will continue to pull until their fortunes
shift. Activists and scholars need to explore means to unite the
interests of urban progressive communities concerned about in-
carceration with rural progressive communities concerned
about the moral and economic health of the heartland.
The Census Bureau has the most power to make specific
reforms. In particular, people in prison should fill out their own
forms and provide what they consider to be their "usual resi-
dence." This is the simplest, cleanest way to proceed. Most im-
portantly, it will credit the genuine home community with
connection to these individuals.
It's true that the institutional home may lose some formula
funding for water or sewerage, but these costs can be covered in
other ways. States often reimburse towns or counties for the
lost tax revenue associated with the public use of land, and
state departments of corrections often make arrangements for
71. Zachary R. Dowdy, Prisoner Count Tips Census Scales: Funds Don't go to
Their Hometowns, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3, 2000, at A06.
72. Id.
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police and fire. These are the appropriate mechanisms for cov-
ering these costs.
It's also true that the address provided might not be valid.
But court papers use an official "last known address" and the
parole authorities ask people in prison to provide an expected
address for return. If the address provided is good enough for
their purposes of individual tracking, it should be good enough
for the Census Bureau's more statistical purposes. Moreover,
the Census Bureau accepts unstable addresses for homeless
people, migrant workers and even the highly mobile urban
youth who sometimes end up behind bars for a while. The diffi-
culty in precisely identifying individuals' home address should
not be a barrier to putting them in their own neighborhood
rather than an entirely different congressional district.
Funding formulas can also be adjusted to minimize this
problem. The Appalachian Regional Commission could adjust
the formula to "non-institutionalized population" rather than
"population." The data is just as readily available from the Cen-
sus Bureau, with just a few extra clicks on the web page. Simi-
larly, agencies like HUD that assess minority representation or
per capita income can adjust their formulas to avoid the distor-
tions of institutionalized population. It will enable them to tar-
get their limited funds more closely on the intended result.
Litigation might help to spur some particular reforms. The
Census Bureau's use of the usual residence rule is likely not
"arbitrary and capricious" under the relevant legal authority.7 3
However, there may be some specific violations of equal protec-
tion. Stretches could be made to challenge funding flows, espe-
cially where the prison population is disproportionately
minority and people in prison are excluded by definition from
using the funds-such as specialty taxes for sport fishing.
Closer to fundamental rights, a plaintiff in a heavily minority
district with a large number of residents counted in prisons
outside the district may have a strong, if novel, vote dilution
claim. Even stronger arguments can be made under state con-
73. The Administrative Procedures Act gives the Census Bureau, like other
executive agencies, broad authority to determine its own rules. See 5 U.S.C. §706
(1966); see also Dist. of Columbia v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 789 F. Supp. 1179
(1992).
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stitutional law, combining state equal protection theory with
state definitions of residence.
The U.S. Census Bureau consistently does a tremendous
job in the arduous task of the decennial count. It is odd, how-
ever, that people who are easy to count by virtue of their con-
finement should present such difficulty. A simple rule deprives
them of the economic and political clout to which they are enti-
tled as members of this great nation. Fortunately, rules can
change.
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